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Abstract
In this paper we show that when individuals in a bipartite network exclusively choose partners and
exchange valued goods with their partners, then there exists a set of exchanges that are pair-wise stable.
Pair-wise stability implies that no individual breaks her partnership and no two neighbors in the network
can form a new partnership while breaking other partnerships if any so that at least one of them improves
her payoff and the other one does at least as good. We consider a general class of continuous, strictly
convex and strongly monotone preferences over bundles of goods for individuals. Thus, this work extends
the general equilibrium framework from markets to networks with exclusive exchanges. We present the
complete existence proof using the existence of a generalized stable matching in [7]. The existence proof
can be extended to problems in social games as in [3] and [4].
1 Introduction
In this paper we show that when individuals in a bipartite network exclusively
choose partners and exchange valued goods with their partners, then there exists
a set of exchanges that are pair-wise stable. Pair-wise stability implies that no
individual breaks her partnership and no two neighbors in the network can form
a new partnership while breaking other partnerships if any so that at least one of
them improves her payoff and the other one does at least as good. We consider a
general class of continuous, strictly convex and strongly monotone preferences over
bundles of goods for individuals. Thus, this work extends the general equilibrium
framework from markets to networks with exclusive exchanges. However, unlike
the general equilibrium, the strategy set of individuals is not a continuous demand
but is hybrid, since along with demand, the individuals also choose the partners. A
simplified version of this problem has been studied in the context of the assignment
game [6] where the authors only consider indivisible goods. The existence of a
stable set of exchanges is shown through the existence of a feasible solution for
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the associated relaxed linear program. However, the same methodology cannot
be extended to the divisible goods case unless restrictive assumptions are made
about the preferences. A similar problem has been studied in [3]. The authors
study a similar concept called Matching Equilibrium in Bipartite social games and
show its existence by the convergence of the Gale-Shapley deferred acceptance
algorithm [2]. However, even in their case the Gale-Shapley deferred acceptance
algorithm cannot be applied to the case where the set of Nash Equilibria for any
pair of individuals is uncountable. We present the complete existence proof using
the existence of a generalized stable matching in [7]. The existence proof can be
extended to problems in social games as in [3] and [4].
The organization of the rest of the paper is as such. In section 2, we present the
model of bilateral exchanges in networks and characterize the properties of such
exchanges. In section 3, we introduce the network exchange game. In section 4 we
present the solution concept of pair-wise stability and in section 5 we prove the
existence of a pair-wise stable strategy profile in the network exchange game.
2 Model
In this section we introduce the model of network exchange. We first introduce the
network, bilateral exchanges and pareto-efficient exchanges and payoffs and then
characterize the sets of exchanges and payoffs. and the relations between them.
2.1 Network
A social network is a weighted undirected graph S = (N,E,W ), where N is the
set of actors, E is the set of links between actors (E ⊆ N ×N) and W : E → R+
is a function over the links and represents the capacity of the link. The set of
neighbors of a node i ∈ N is Nbr (i) = {j ∈ N : (i, j) ∈ E}.
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We defineM = {X, Y } as the set of types of items of value that can be exchanged
between the actors. Each actor i ∈ N has exactly one type of item Mi ∈ M . The
amount of itemMi with actor i is |Mi|. Each actor i ∈ N has continuous, strictly
convex and strongly monotone preferences i over bundles of items. Alter-
natively, each actor i has a continuous, strictly quasi-concave and strongly
monotone utility function pii : R2+ → R+.
The set of actors can be divided into two disjoint sets based upon the item they
have. Let A = {i ∈ N :Mi = X} and B = {j ∈ N :Mj = Y }. Then an actor in
A can only perform a rationally feasible exchange with another actor in B. Thus
without loss of generality, we restrict our attention to bipartite social networks in
which E ∈ A × B. We will call the actors in A, the buyers and the actors in B,
the sellers.
2.2 Bilateral Exchanges
An exchange between an actor i and j with (i, j) ∈ E, is a tuple (mi,mj) ∈
[0, |Mi|]× [0, |Mj|] and involves i giving amount mi units of item Mi to actor j and
j giving some amount mj units of item Mj to actor i.
Each link (i, j) ∈ E is an exchange opportunity of capacity W (i, j) between
i and j. The capacity of an exchange opportunity (i, j) is the maximum allowed
amount of items that can be exchanged between the actors i and j, i.e.- for any
exchange (mi,mj) between i, and j, mi + mj ≤ W (i, j). The set of possible
exchanges EX (i, j) between neighboring actors i, j is a polytope specified by the
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following inequalities.
0 ≤ mi ≤ |Mi| (1)
0 ≤ mj ≤ |Mj| (2)
mi +mj ≤ W (i, j) (3)
The payoff function for actor i in an exchange opportunity (i, j) is Vij : EX (i, j)→
R and the payoff function for actor j is Vji : EX (i, j) → R. In an exchange
(mi,mj) between i and j, the payoff of actor i is Vij (mi,mj) = pii (|Mi| −mi,mj)−
pii (|Mi|, 0) and the payoff of actor j is Vji (mi,mj) = pij (mi, |Mj| −mj)−pij (0, |Mj|).
From the assumptions on pii and pij, the functions Vij and Vji are continuous, strictly
quasi-concave and strongly monotone. Vij is increasing in mj and decreasing in mi
and Vji is increasing in mi and decreasing in mj. The set RX (i, j) ⊂ EX (i, j) of
rationally feasible exchanges between actors i and j is the convex and compact
set specified by the following inequalities.
0 ≤ mi ≤ |Mi| (4)
0 ≤ mj ≤ |Mj| (5)
mi +mj ≤ W (i, j) (6)
Vij (mi,mj) ≥ 0 (7)
Vji (mj,mi) ≥ 0 (8)
The convexity comes from the fact that Vij and Vji are strictly quasi-concave and
EX (i, j) is a polytope.
A payoff vector function Vi,j : EX (i, j)→ R2 maps the exchanges to the
payoffs of the actors. The payoff vector for exchange (mi,mj) in the exchange
opportunity (i, j) is a tuple Vi,j (mi,mj) = (Vij (mi,mj) , Vji (mj,mi)). From the
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Figure 1: The possible exchange set (EX(i, j)) includes rationally feasible exchange set (RX(i, j)) and
the pareto-efficient exchange set (PX(i, j)) includes the rationally feasible pareto-efficient exchange set
(RPX(i, j)). The payoff-vector function Vi,j maps these exchange sets to the set of payoff-vectors. The
possible exchange set EX(i, j) is mapped onto the set of possible payoff vectors XV (i, j). The rationally
feasible exchange set RX(i, j) is mapped onto the set of rationally feasible payoff vectors RV (i, j). The
pareto-efficient exchange set PX(i, j) is mapped onto the set of pareto-efficient payoff vectors PQ(i, j)([0, 1]).
The rationally feasible pareto-efficient exchange set RPX(i, j) is mapped onto the set of rationally feasi-
ble pareto-efficient payoff vectors RQ(i, j)([0, 1]). XV (i, j) includes RV (i, j) and PQ(i, j)([0, 1]) includes
RQ(i, j)([0, 1]). PQ(i, j) is a path in XV (i, j) and RQ(i, j) is a path in RV (i, j).
continuity of Vij and Vji, Vi,j is continuous.
The set of possible payoff vectors XV (i, j) is the image of EX (i, j) under
the function Vi,j. The set of rationally feasible payoff vectors RV (i, j) is the
image of RX (i, j) under the function Vi,j.
The relationship between the sets of exchanges and the set of payoff vectors is
captured in figure 2.2.
We now characterize the set of possible payoff vectors and the set of rationally
feasible payoff vectors in the following proposition.
Proposition 1. The set of possible payoff vectors XV (i, j) and the set of rationally
feasible payoff vectors RV (i, j) in the exchange opportunity (i, j) are connected and
compact.
Proof. We know that EX (i, j) and RX (i, j) are convex and hence connected.
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Since Vi,j is continuous, therefore by the intermediate value theorem [1] for con-
nected spaces, the images of EX (i, j) and RX (i, j) under Vi,j are connected.
Hence, XV (i, j) and RV (i, j) are connected. Also, since EX (i, j) and RX (i, j)
are compact, their images under the continuous function Vi,j are compact. Hence,
XV (i, j) and RV (i, j) are compact.
From the strong monotonicity property of Vij and Vji,the maximum payoff for
i over all exchanges in EX (i, j) is V ∗i (EX (i, j)) = Vij (0,min{|Mj|,W (i, j)})
and the maximum payoff for j over all exchanges in EX (i, j) is V ∗j (EX (i, j)) =
Vji (min{|Mi|,W (i, j)}, 0). The minimum payoff for i over all exchanges in EX (i, j)
is V ◦i (EX (i, j)) = Vij (min{|Mi|,W (i, j)}, 0) and the maximum payoff for j over
all exchanges in EX (i, j) is
V ◦j (EX (i, j)) = Vji (0,min{|Mj|,W (i, j)}).
We will represent the maximum rationally feasible payoff for i over RX (i, j)
as V ∗i (RX (i, j)) and the maximum rationally feasible payoff for j over RX (i, j)
is V ∗j (RX (i, j)). The minimum rationally feasible payoff for i over RX (i, j) is
V ◦i (RX (i, j)) and the maximum rationally feasible payoff for j over RX (i, j) is
V ◦j (RX (i, j)).
From the intermediate value theorem, we know that for any
x ∈ [V ◦i (EX (i, j)) , V ∗i (EX (i, j))], there exists an exchange (mi,mj) ∈ EX(i, j)
for which the payoff for i is Vij (mi,mj) = x. Similarly, for any x ∈ [V ◦j (EX (i, j)) , V ∗j (EX (i, j))],
there exists an exchange (mi,mj) ∈ EX(i, j) for which the payoff for j is Vji (mi,mj) =
x. Therefore the set of possible payoffs for i is [V ◦i (EX (i, j)) , V ∗i (EX (i, j))] and
the set of possible payoffs for j is [V ◦j (EX (i, j)) , V ∗j (EX (i, j))].
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2.3 Pareto-efficient exchanges
The set of pareto-efficient exchanges or pareto-set between two actors i, j is
PX (i, j) = {(mi,mj) ∈ EX (i, j) : @
(
m
′
i,m
′
j
)
∈ EX (i, j) , with Vi,j
(
m
′
i,m
′
j
)
> Vi,j
(
m
′
i,m
′
j
)
}
(9)
The set of pareto-efficient payoff vectors is the image of the pareto-set under the
payoff-vector function Vi,j.
For any x ∈ [V ◦i (EX (i, j)) , V ∗i (EX (i, j))] and y ∈ [V ◦j (EX (i, j)) , V ∗j (EX (i, j))],
we define the upper-level sets Ui(x) = {(mi,mj) ∈ EX (i, j) : Vij (mi,mj) ≥ x}
and Uj(y) = {(mi,mj) : Vji (mi,mj) ≥ y}.
Given, qi ∈ [V ◦i (EX (i, j)) , V ∗i (EX (i, j))] a pareto-efficient exchange
(
mpii (qi) ,m
pi
j (qi)
)
between actors i and j that gives a payoff of at least qi to actor i is characterized
by
(
mpii (qi) ,m
pi
j (qi)
) ∈ argmax
(mi,mj)∈Ui(qi)
Vji (mj,mi) (10)
Clearly, there exists at least one such exchange because qi ∈ [V ◦i (EX (i, j)) , V ∗i (EX (i, j))].
Proposition 2. The characteristics of the pareto-efficient exchanges that satisfy
relation 10 for some qi ∈ [V ◦i (EX (i, j)) , V ∗i (EX (i, j))] are:
1. For each qi ∈ [V ◦i (EX (i, j)) , V ∗i (EX (i, j))], there is a unique pareto-efficient
exchange
(
mpii (qi) ,m
pi
j (qi)
)
that satisfies relation 10.
2. The payoff Vij
(
mpii (qi) ,m
pi
j (qi)
)
= qi.
3. The payoff Vji
(
mpii (qi) ,m
pi
j (qi)
)
is strictly decreasing in qi.
Proof. Firstly, we notice that since the payoff functions Vij and Vji are strictly
quasi-concave and continuous, therefore for any
x ∈ [V ◦i (EX (i, j)) , V ∗i (EX (i, j))]
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and
y ∈ [V ◦j (EX (i, j)) , V ∗j (EX (i, j))]
the upper-level sets Ui (x) and Uj (y) are strictly convex and compact. For claim 1,
assume there are at least two pareto-efficient exchanges
(
m
′
i,m
′
j
)
and
(
m
′′
i ,m
′′
j
)
that
satisfy 10. Then Vji
(
m
′
i,m
′
j
)
= Vji
(
m
′′
i ,m
′′
j
)
and Vij
(
m
′
i,m
′
j
) ≥ qi, Vji (m′′i ,m′′j ) ≥
qi. Define
(
m
′′′
i ,m
′′′
j
)
= 0.5
(
m
′
i,m
′
j
)
+ 0.5
(
m
′′
i ,m
′′
j
)
. Then
(
m
′′′
i ,m
′′′
j
)
belongs in
both the upper-level sets and:
Vji
(
m
′′′
i ,m
′′′
j
)
> Vji
(
m
′
i,m
′
j
)
Vji
(
m
′′′
i ,m
′′′
j
)
> Vji
(
m
′′
i ,m
′′
j
)
Vij
(
m
′′′
i ,m
′′′
j
)
> qi
This contradicts the assumption that both
(
m
′
i,m
′
j
)
and
(
m
′′
i ,m
′′
j
)
satisfy 10.
Therefore claim 1 holds.
For claim 2 assume Vij
(
mpii (qi) ,m
pi
j (qi)
)
> qi. There are three possible cases
as discussed next.
Case 1: If mpij (qi) > 0. Then consider the exchange, (m
pi
i (qi) , 0). From the
intermediate value theorem, there exists λ ∈ (0, 1), such that
qi < Vij
(
mpii (qi) , λm
pi
j (qi)
)
< Vij
(
mpii (qi) ,m
pi
j (qi)
)
.
Therefore
(
mpii (qi) , λm
pi
j (qi)
) ∈ Ui (qi). From the strong monotonicity of Vji,
Vji
(
mpii (qi) , λm
pi
j (qi)
)
> Vji
(
mpii (qi) ,m
pi
j (qi)
)
.
This contradicts the assumption that
(
mpii (qi) ,m
pi
j (qi)
)
satisfies 10.
Case 2: If mpij (qi) = 0 but m
pi
i (qi) < min{|Mi|,W (i, j)}. Then consider the
exchange, (mi,mj) =
(
min{|Mi|,W (i, j)},mpij (qi)
)
. From the intermediate value
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theorem, there exists λ ∈ (0, 1), such that
qi < Vij
(
(1− λ)mpii (qi) + λmi,mpij (qi)
)
< Vij
(
mpii (qi) ,m
pi
j (qi)
)
.
Therefore
(
(1− λ)mpii (qi) + λmi,mpij (qi)
) ∈ Ui (qi). From the strong monotonic-
ity of Vji,
Vji
(
(1− λ)mpii (qi) + λmi,mpij (qi)
)
> Vji
(
mpii (qi) ,m
pi
j (qi)
)
.
This contradicts the assumption that
(
mpii (qi) ,m
pi
j (qi)
)
satisfies 10. In either of
the two cases, by contradiction, Vij
(
mpii (qi) ,m
pi
j (qi)
)
= qi.
Case 3: Ifmpij (qi) = 0 butm
pi
i (qi) = min{|Mi|,W (i, j)}, then Vij
(
mpii (qi) ,m
pi
j (qi)
)
=
V ◦i (EX (i, j)) ≤ qi which contradicts the assumption. Therefore by contradiction,
Vij
(
mpii (qi) ,m
pi
j (qi)
)
= qi.
For claim 3 pick any q′i, q
′′
i ∈ [V ◦i (EX (i, j)) , V ∗i (EX (i, j))] with q′i > q′′i . Then
since
(
mpii
(
q
′′
i
)
,mpij
(
q
′′
i
))
is pareto-efficient, therefore
Vji
(
mpii
(
q
′′
i
)
,mpij
(
q
′′
i
))
> Vji
(
mpii
(
q
′
i
)
,mpij
(
q
′
i
))
.
Thus claim 3 holds.
For a pair of neighboring actors (i, j) in the network, we define the functions
V pji : [V
◦
i (EX (i, j)) , V
∗
i (EX (i, j))]→ [V ◦j (EX (i, j)) , V ∗j (EX (i, j))] (11)
V pij : [V
◦
j (EX (i, j)) , V
∗
j (EX (i, j))]→ [V ◦i (EX (i, j)) , V ∗i (EX (i, j))] (12)
where, V pji (x) = Vji
(
mpii (x) ,m
pi
j (x)
)
and V pij (x) = Vij
(
m
pj
i (x) ,m
pj
j (x)
)
. (13)
Proposition 3. The functions V pji and V
p
ij are inverse of each other, strictly de-
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creasing and continuous.
Proof. Firstly using proposition 2, we notice that V pji (x) is uniquely defined for
each x in its domain and V pji is strictly decreasing. Similarly, V
p
ij (x) is uniquely
defined for each x in its domain and V pij is strictly decreasing.
Pick x ∈ [V ◦i (EX (i, j)) , V ∗i (EX (i, j))] and y = V pji (x). Since (x, y) is the
unique pareto-efficient payoff with j’s payoff as y, therefore V pij (y) = x = V
p−1
ji
(
V pji (x)
)
.
Also, since V pij is uniquely defined over its domain, therefore the range of V
p
ji is
[V ◦j (EX (i, j)) , V
∗
j (EX (i, j))]. Similarly, the range of V
p
ij is [V ◦i (EX (i, j)) , V ∗i (EX (i, j))].
Therefore, V pji and V
p
ij are inverse of each other.
For the continuity, consider any interval
[
V ◦j (EX (i, j)) , y
] ⊆ [V ◦j (EX (i, j)) , V ∗j (EX (i, j))].
Define x = V p
−1
ji (y) = V
p
ij (y). Then since V
p
ji and V
p
ij are strictly decreasing,
∀z ∈ [V ◦j (EX (i, j)) , y] , V p−1ji (z) = V pij (z) ∈ [x, V ∗i (EX (i, j))]
and ∀z ∈ [x, V ∗i (EX (i, j))] , V pji (z) ∈ [V ◦j (EX (i, j)) , y]
Since, y were arbitrarily picked, therefore the pre-image of all closed left intervals
in
[V ◦j (EX (i, j)) , V
∗
j (EX (i, j))] are closed. Therefore, V
p
ji is continuous. By similar
reasoning, V pij is continuous.
Since V pji and V
p
ij are continuous, we can create a path PQ
i,j : [0, 1]→ XV (i, j)
such that all pareto-efficient payoff vectors are in the range of the path as follows.
PQi,j (x) =
(
(1− x)V ◦i (EX (i, j)) + xV ∗i (EX (i, j)) , V pji ((1− x)V ◦i (EX (i, j)) + xV ∗i (EX (i, j)))
)
(14)
The range PQi,j([0, 1]) of PQi,j is the set of all pareto-efficient payoff vectors.
Similarly, since V pji maps points in [V ◦i (RX (i, j)) , V ∗i (RX (i, j))] in [V ◦j (RX (i, j)) , V ∗j (RX (i, j))]
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and V pij maps points in [V ◦j (RX (i, j)) , V ∗j (RX (i, j))] in [V ◦i (RX (i, j)) , V ∗i (RX (i, j))],
therefore the set of rationally feasible pareto-efficient payoff vectors is a path-
connected subset of the set of pareto-efficient payoff vectors. Therefore we can
create a path RQi,j : [0, 1] → RV (i, j) such that all rationally feasible pareto-
efficient payoff vectors are in the range of the path as follows.
RQi,j (x) =
(
(1− x)V ◦i (RX (i, j)) + xV ∗i (RX (i, j)) , V pji ((1− x)V ◦i (RX (i, j)) + xV ∗i (RX (i, j)))
)
(15)
The range RQi,j([0, 1]) of RQi,j is the set of all rationally feasible pareto-efficient
payoff vectors. We will refer to the elements of RQi,j (x) as RQi,ji (x) and RQ
i,j
j (x)
respectively. Thus RQi,ji is strictly increasing and since V
p
ji is strictly decreasing,
therefore RQi,jj is strictly decreasing.
2.4 Exchange network
Two exchange opportunities (i, j) and (i, k) are connected to the degree that ex-
change in one opportunity is contingent on exchange (or nonexchange) in the other
opportunity. (a) The connection is positive if exchange in one opportunity is con-
tingent on exchange in the other, (b) The connection is negative if exchange in
one opportunity is contingent on nonexchange in the other [5]. In this paper, we
restrict our attention to negative connections. Thus each actor can enter into an
exchange with at most one of its neighbors.
An exchange network is a graph G = (N,EN) where EN ⊆ E is the set of ex-
change opportunities in the social network along which the exchanges happen. We
call these active exchange opportunities in the exchange network G. For simplicity,
we will refer to EN as the exchange network when N will be understood.
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3 Network Exchange Game
We now introduce the network exchange game. The network exchange game forms
the fundamental structure of analysis in our work on exchange networks. In a
negatively connected network, the actors pick at most one neighbor to perform
an exchange with and also pick the terms of exchange. An exchange happens if
two actors sharing an exchange opportunity pick each other and terms of exchange
picked by each is agreeable to the other. An actor obtains a positive payoff only if
she performs an exchange.
On the social network S, with the capacities of the exchange opportunities
W , for any actor i ∈ N with |Mi| units of the item Mi ∈ M , let Nbr (i) =
{j ∈ N : (i, j) ∈ E} be the set of neighbors of actor i, determined by the social
network S.
A pure strategy for an actor i ∈ N is pi = (j,mi,mj) i.e. choose j ∈ Nbr (i)
to perform an exchange and choose to give mi ≤ |Mi| units of Mi to j and ask
for mj ≤ |Mj| of Mj from j such that mi + mj ≤ W (i, j). The set of pure
strategies for an actor i is Pi ⊆ Nbr(i) × R2+. A pure strategy profile is the
tuple p =
(
p1, p2, ..., p|N |
)
. The set of pure strategy profiles is P =
|N |∏
i=1
Pi. If for any
exchange opportunity (i, j), RX (i, j) = φ or RV (i, j) = {0}, then we can remove
the exchange opportunity from the network without affecting the payoffs for any
outcomes. Therefore, without loss of generality, we assume that for each exchange
opportunity (i, j) ∈ E, RX (i, j) is non-empty and there is at least one positive
rationally feasible payoff vector (vi, vj) > 0 in RV (i, j).
For a pure strategy profile p ∈ P , an exchange opportunity (i, j) ∈ E is used for
exchange between the actors i and j iff, pi = (j,mi,mj) and pj = (i,mj,mi), for
some mi ≤ |Mi|, mj ≤ |Mj|, mi +mj ≤ W (i, j). We then say that the exchange
opportunity (i, j) ∈ EN is in the exchange network.
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For a pure strategy profile p ∈ P , the payoff of the actor i is positive only if
∃j ∈ Nbr (i), s.t. and pi = (j,mi,mj) and pj = (i,mj,mi), for some mi ≤ |Mi|,
mj ≤ |Mj|, mi +mj ≤ W (i, j); the payoff of i is then ui (p) = Vij (mi,mj).
Thus a strategy profile p induces a unique exchange network EN (p), where
EN (p) = {(i, j) ∈ E : pi = (j,mi,mj) , pj = (i,mj,mi)}. In the cannonical normal
form, the game can be represented by the tuple 〈N,P, U〉, where N is the set of
selfish actors, P is the set of pure strategy profiles, and U is the payoff function
U : P → R|N |.
The social network provides a constraint on the strategies of the actors and
the exchange opportunities provide a constraint on the payoffs derived by the
actors. An actor’s pure strategy determines a neighbor she picks to exchange
with and the terms of exchange she proposes. If the proposal is mutually agreed
upon, a contract or an exchange relationship is formed. In this one shot game,
such exchange relationships form an exchange network. The outcome of the game
determines both an exchange network and the payoffs for the individuals. In the
following theorem and the corollaries, we identify some properties of the payoffs
in an exchange network and some constraints on the structure of the exchange
network.
For a given exchange network, EN , the set of strategy profiles P (EN) =
{p ∈ P : EN (p) = EN} will be referred to as the supporting strategies for EN .
The set of payoff profiles supported by EN isV (EN) =
{
V ∈ R|N| : ∃p ∈ P (EN) s.t. U (p) = V}.
We will say that EN supports a payoff profile V.
4 Solution Concept
The solution concept we explore is of pair-wise stability following [8]. We note that
Nash equilibrium is not very informative in the exchange network, since formation
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of any exchange relationship needs actions by two actors, hence, any change in the
action of one player cannot lead to formation of a new link and cannot increase
her payoff. Hence, a different notion of equilibrium based upon pair wise stability
is needed. The following defines the notion of stability in an exchange network.
A strategy profile is pair-wise stable if, no actor can increase her payoff by
changing her strategy (changing the neighbor to propose to or proposing different
terms of exchange) and no pair of actors having an exchange opportunity described
by the graph S, can jointly change their strategies (to perform an exchange) such
that at least one of the actors increases her payoff and the other actor does not
decrease her payoff.
Definition 1. Formally, a strategy profile, p, is pair-wise stable if ui (p) ≥ ui (p′i, p−i)
∀i ∈ N, p′i ∈ Pi and ui
(
p′i, p
′
j, p−{i,j}
)
> ui (p) ⇒ uj
(
p′i, p
′
j, p−{i,j}
)
< uj (p)
∀ (i, j) ∈ E, p′i ∈ Pi, p′j ∈ Pj. An exchange network EN is pair-wise stable if
there exists a supporting strategy profile, p, for EN such that p is pair-wise sta-
ble. A payoff profile V is pair-wise stable if there exists a pair-wise stable strategy
profile p with U (p) = V.
We now provide an equivalent characterization of the pair-wise stable strategy
profile that will be used to show the existence of a pair-wise stable strategy profile.
Lemma 1. If a strategy profile p∗ in the network exchange game is not pair-wise
stable then at least one of the conditions holds:
1. there exists and actor i with strategy p∗i = (j,mi,mj), such that Vij(mi,mj) <
0.
2. there exists an exchanges opportunity, (i, j) ∈ E, and rationally feasible pareto-
efficient payoff vector (vi, vj) ∈ RQi,j([0, 1]), such that vi ≥ ui(p∗) and vj ≥
uj(p
∗) with at least one strict inequality.
Proof. Assume p∗ is not pair-wise stable and that each actor i ∈ N , has a strat-
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egy p∗i = (j,mi,mj), such that Vij(mi,mj) ≥ 0. First we note that if an actor
i can unilaterally deviate to a strategy p′i = (j,mi,mj) and increase her pay-
off then p∗j = (i,mi,mj). Therefore, uj(p∗) = 0. Since RV (i, j) has at least
one non-zero rationally feasible pareto-efficient payoff vector therefore there ex-
ists a rationally feasible pareto-efficient payoff vector (vi, vj) = RQi,j(1) such that
vi = V
∗
i (RX(i, j)) ≥ Vij(mi,mj) = ui(p′i, p∗−1) and vj = 0. Therefore the second
condition is satisfied.
Secondly, if two actors i, j with (i, j) ∈ E can deviate simultaneously their
strategies to p′i = (j,mi,mj) and p
′
j = (j,mi,mj) to increase their payoffs. With-
out loss of generality assume Vij(mi,mj) > ui(p∗) and Vji(mi,mj) ≥ uj. Then
V pji(Vij(mi,mj)) ≥ Vji(mi,mj) ≥ uj(p∗) and (Vij(mi,mj), V pji(Vij(mi,mj))) ∈ RQi,j([0, 1]).
The characterization of pair-wise stable strategy profile in lemma 1 will be used
in the next section to prove the existence of a pair-wise stable strategy profile.
5 Existence of Pair-wise Stable Strategy Profiles and Pair-
wise Stable Exchange Networks
To show the existence of a pair-wise stable strategy profile, we reduce the problem
to a similar problem in [7]. In [7], we showed the existence of a weighted stable
matching. We will show that there is a corresponding pair-wise stable strategy
profile. We now state the existence theorem.
Theorem 1. For any network exchange game 〈N,P, U〉 as introduced in section
3, there exists a pair-wise-stable strategy profile p∗.
Proof. Arbitrarily pick a network exchanges game 〈N,P, U〉 as introduced in sec-
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tion 3 and consider the following system of inequalities:
si + sj = 1,∀ (i, j) ∈ EN (16)
ui = RQ
i,j
i (si) , uj = RQ
i,j
j (1− sj) ,∀ (i, j) ∈ EN (17)(
RQi,ji
)−1
(ui) + 1−
(
RQi,jj
)−1
(uj) ≥ 1,∀ (i, j) ∈ E (18)
si ≥ 0,∀i ∈ N (19)
In [7], we showed the existence of feasible solutions to the above system of inequal-
ities when RQi,ji is continuous and strictly increasing and RQ
i,j
j continuous and is
strictly decreasing. Pick a feasible solution (s∗, EN∗) for the system and create a
strategy profile for the network exchange game as follows:
• For each (i, j) ∈ EN∗, set p∗i = (j,mpii (RQi,ji (si)),mpij (RQi,ji (si))) and
p∗j = (i,m
pi
i (RQ
i,j
i (si)),m
pi
j (RQ
i,j
i (si)))
where (mpii (RQ
i,j
i (si)),m
pi
j (RQ
i,j
i (si))) is the unique exchange satisfying 10.
• For each unmatched i ∈ N , arbitrarily pick a neighbor j ∈ Nbr(i) and set
p∗i = (j, 0, 0).
We now show that p∗ is pair-wise stable. Assume p∗ is not pair-wise stable.
First we note that for all i ∈ N , the strategy p∗i = (j,mi,mj) is such that
Vij(mi,mj) ≥ 0. Then by lemma 1 there exits an exchange opportunity (i, j) ∈ E
and a rationally feasible pareto-efficient payoff vector (vi, vj) ∈ RQi,j([0, 1]) such
that vi ≥ ui(p∗) and vj ≥ uj(p∗) with at least one strict inequality. Pick any
such exchange opportunity (i, j). Clearly, (i, j) /∈ EN because by definition
(ui(p
∗), uj(p∗)) is a pareto-efficient payoff vector for the exchange opportunity (i, j).
Without loss of generality, assume vi ≥ ui(p∗). Define λ1 =
(
RQi,ji
)−1
(ui(p
∗)) and
λ2 =
(
RQi,ji
)−1
(vi). Then λ2 > λ1 and from the definition 12, uj(p∗) ≥ RQi,jj (λ1).
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Therefore uj(p∗) ≥ RQi,jj (λ1) > RQi,jj (λ2) = vj which contradicts the assumption
that vj ≥ uj(p∗). Since (i, j) was arbitrarily picked, therefore there does not exist
an exchange opportunity (i, j) ∈ E and a rationally feasible pareto-efficient payoff
vector (vi, vj) ∈ RQi,j([0, 1]) such that vi ≥ ui(p∗) and vj ≥ uj(p∗) with at least
one strict inequality. Therefore by lemma 1, p∗ is pair-wise stable.
Thus we have proved the existence of a pair-wise stable strategy profile in every
network exchange game as introduced in section 3. The pair-wise stable strategy
profile induces a pair-wise stable exchange network and a pair-wise stable payoff
profile and hence, every network exchange game as introduced in section 3 has a
pair-wise stable stable exchange network and a pair-wise stable payoff profile.
6 Conclusion
In this paper we show that when the individuals in a bipartite network exclusively
choose partners and exchange valued goods with their partners, then there exists
a set of exchanges that are pair-wise stable.
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